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ASSOCIATION "FOR THE MERETORIOUS PURPOSE
OF... MUTUAL BENEFIT": A CHRONICLE OF
TIE BUILDING AND LOAN INDUSTRY IN
MARYLAND FROM 1852-1961
(Part 2)t
By JOHN W. SAUSE, JR.*
III. PERMANENCE BRE s CHANGE
The Permanent associations achieved perpetual exist-
ence; but it was found that this was not a complete solu-
tion to the problems of the Terminating plan. The removal
of the necessity for collecting a "bonus" undoubtedly at-
tracted persons who would not otherwise have been able
to join an association after its formation, and thus brought
about a potentially constant flow of new money into the
t This is the second of two parts. The first part appeared in 22 Mary-
land Law Review 1.
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association. But, the number of such persons would have
to be great in order to have an appreciable effect upon the
slow accumulation of money for "advance" transactions
through the weekly collections. The matter was as im-
portant then, as now:
"As we understand the operations of a building
association [said the Court of Appeals in 1956] it must
have some funds on hand to meet the borrowing needs
of its members. Some of the money comes from the
weekly payments made under existing loans; but with-
out some free share capital, a building association
would be severely handicapped and its business would
tend to dry up. If it wishes to grow and prosper, it
must ordinarily be able to attract some new capital."'40
The Permanent plan allowed an inducement of sorts to
prospective savers, since it was necessary to ascertain the
profits at fairly regular intervals in order that they might
be divided among those who had been members during
the period and that it might be determined which shares
had matured.'14  As a lure to those who might wish to join
the association for saving purposes, some, perhaps all, of
the Permanent associations adopted the practice of allow-
ing a free shareholder to withdraw from the association
prior to the time that his stock subscription was fulfilled
and to receive, in addition to his accumulated dues, the
dividends which had been credited to his account from time
to time.142 Such a device had an obviously limited effect;
and in some quarters it was seen adding as much instability
as the Terminating plan.143 Even as the Permanent plan
took shape in Maryland, a more drastic remedy was de-
veloping in Ohio, which had the second largest number of
associations (718) and the largest proportion of Permanent
associations (90.2%) in the nation.4
10 Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 461, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
141 THOMPSON, BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1899) § 9, (1st ed. 1892)
§ 4; THORNTON & BLACKLEDGE, 'BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1898)
§ 9. Compare Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. .569, 572, 47 A.
2d 769 (1946) ; Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 680, GS A.
887 (1907).
1E.g. Balto. Bldg. As'n v. Powhaltan Co., 87 Md. 59, 39 A. 274 (1898).
Under the Terminating plan, some but not all of the associations -allowed
a non-borrowing member to withdraw the due8 which he had paid in.
Cf. Hampstead Build. Asso. v. King, 58 Md. 279 (1882); Peter's 'Build.
Ass'n v. Jlaecksch, 51 Md. 198 (1879).
143THOMPSON, (2d ed.) op. cit. supra, n. 141, § 9; THORNTON & -LACK-
LEDGE. op. cit. supra. n. 141, § 9.
'"Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, ' Building and
Loan Associaitions," H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 209, 53d Cong. Sess. 14-15 (1894).
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The Dayton Plan
The "Dayton plan," as the operation of the new associa-
tion was called, was not generally understood. Indeed, the
contemporary textwriters abandoned any attempt to de-
scribe the system and merely quoted a description (the
same in each case) furnished by the Ohio inspector of
building and loan associations; 45 and there was similar
abdication in the Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor
in 1894.146 And the writer to whom these authorities de-
ferred confused the attributes of his prodigy with those
of its parent, the Permanent plan.147 In fact, the "Dayton
plan" contained only one innovation: paid-up stock.148
The necessity for such capitalization was clear. As ex-
plained by the manager of the then-largest association
operating under the system:
"[Paid-up stock] . .. is not issued at all times, but
only when the society can profitably loan the money.
It may be called in also if a glut of money occurs. It
is entitled to share in the earnings like other stock,
but dividends when declared instead of being credited
on the book as in the case of running [i.e., subscrip-
tion] stock, are paid in cash. It may also be withdrawn
the same as running stock. In fact, barring the fact
145 ENDLICH, BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1895) § 23, fn. 1; THOMPSON
(2d ed. 1899) § 10; THORNTON & BLACKLEDGE, Op. Cit. supra, n. 141, § 12A.
See also, SUNDHEIM, BTILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3rd ed. 1933) § 4.
11 Report of the Commissioner of Labor, supra, n. 144, 333-337.
1' The latter authority lists four characteristics of the Dayton plan:
(a) New members may join at any time without paying any back dues;
(b) paid-up stock Issued; (c) premium abolished; (d) earnings credited
semi-annually and withdrawable in ithe same manner as money payments.
Although the abolition of the premium was seen as "the most pronounced
difference," the premium had been abandoned in Maryland prior to the
adoption of the Dayton plan. Of. supra, n. 139. And elimination of "back
dues" and withdrawal of dividends had been accomplished under the
Permanent plan.
The American textwriters compounded the confusion by describing Per-
manent associations as having paid up stock. ENDLICH, (2d ed.) op. cit.
supra, n. 145, § 23, (1st ed.) § 46; THOMPSON (2d ed.) op. cit. supra, n. 141,
§ 6. Of. THORNTON & BLACKLEDGE, op. cit. supra, n. 141, §§ 9-10; Coltrane
v. 'Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 281, 284 (C.C.D. 1901),
aff'd sub nom. Coltrane v. Blake, 113 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1902). The early
British Permanent societies did not seem to have paid-up stock. Compare,
STONE, BENEFIT 'BUILDING SOCIETIES (1851) pp. 20-21, with SCRATCHLEY,
BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (4th ed. 1868) § 58, pp. 35-36. In Maryland, at
least, paid-up stock did not exist prior to 1894, although the Permanent
plan had already become the most common form of association. See,
Report of the Commissioner of Labor, op. cit. supra, n. 144, 30.
148 The Dayton plan also involved some system whereby the borrower
would pay interest only on the principal balances actually due from
time to time. This was not, however, a practice unknown to the Permanent
associations in Maryland. See Report of the Commissioner of Labor, op.
cit. supra, n. 144, 393.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that it pays no dues and receives dividends in cash,
it has substantially the same rights and liabilities of
running stock.
"Paid-up stock, however, is an exceedingly useful
adjunct to a building association. It gives the associa-
tion command of a large amount of money to loan and
thus reduces the rates to borrowers. This class of
stockholders is also a little steadier than the book-
holders [i.e., installment shareholders]. They are not
so easily panicked, nor are they so needy as to require
their money at once in case of a stringency in finance
of a business depression.
"Paid-up stock is also a sort of financial regulator
to an association. When money is too plenty, not being
obliged to issue it, the doors are closed and a large
source of supply is shut off. If this does not suffice
even outstanding stock may be called in. When, how-
ever, the demand for money becomes greater than the
supply, paid-up stock being a favorite investment, the
association has but to open the gates and money pours
in until the equilibrium is restored. By these means
the idle cash balance of the association is kept con-
tinually small, and yet all really desirable loans can
be made, and all other demands promptly met. '149
The Act of 1894
In 1894, the Legislature took cognizance of the changes
which had taken place in the building and loan industry.
By Chapter 321 of the Acts of that year, direct amendment
was, for the first time, made to the original Act of 1852:
1. Recognition was given to the practice of issuing serial
stock. There seems to be no reason why, after the 1,000
share limitation was removed by the General Incorpora-
tion Act, such special legislation was needed.'
2. A building and loan association was given "power
to issue full-paid up shares of stock to its members upon
149 Report of the Commissioner of Labor, op. cit. supra, n. 144, 334. The
so-called "Dayton plan" is so similar to the British Permanent associa-
tion (and thus to the non-participating association established by ithe
Maryland Act of 1872) that it is surprising that it acquired a name
suggesting domestic origin. It appears, however, that after the Court of
Appeals discredited the Act of 1872, the idea of the 'British plan was
dropped; and it was re-introduced by way of the interest generated by
the operation of that system in Ohio. For that reason, discussion of
paid-up stock has been postponed to this point in our commentary. Until
then only 7 Maryland associations had such shares. Report of the
Commissioner of Labor, op. cit. supra, n. 144, 30.
'But, as already noted at page 21, n. 89, supra, the lack of such specific
authorization may serve to explain why the Serial associations were
never popular in Maryland.
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such terms as may be set forth in its by-laws." Since build-
ing and loan associations were incorporated under the
General Incorporation Act, the only apparent reason for
such a conferral of authority is to overcome any doubt as
to the limitations which might be inherent in the opera-
tions of a "building and loan association." '151
3. There is also apparently broader authority with re-
spect to the exaction of premiums:
"[I]nstead of receiving the whole amount of said
premium (in advance or deducting the whole amount
of said premium) from the amount of such advance,
the borrower may pay the same in weekly, monthly or
such other instalments as may be agreed upon .... "'52
The provision is similar to that relating to premiums of
non-participating associations under the Act of 1872. It is
peculiar to find this extension of the premium concept
together with provision for paid-up stock, one of the effects
of the latter being to obviate the necessity for a premium.
As a direct result of these changes, some of the six
characteristics which distinguished early building and loan
associations were no longer applicable, or applicable in
only very modified form. In either event, the Court of
Appeals required "strict conformity with the very terms of
the law." '153 Entrance fees were still permitted; and the
Court recognized that they "are in no way connected ...
with the subject of advances, and they enure to the benefit
of all the members by swelling the funds of the Associa-
tion and thereby increasing the profits for distribution.""1 4
But "this does not authorize the charging of entrance fees
to borrowing members only . . . [and] does not contem-
plate a variety of entrance fees, nor does it permit any
entrance fee to be charged in the absence of a provision in
the charter fixing the amount of such fee."' 55
', Cf. Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 281, 284
(C.C.D. 1901). The Master seems to overlook the effect of the Act of 1894.
Probably the 7 associations having paid-up stock prior to the passage
of the statute were incorporated under special act or operated under
the Act of 1872.
MD. LAWS 1894, Ch. 321.
10 Ehrhart v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 157 Md. 40, 44, 145 A. 202 (1929);
Washington Bldg. Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 700, 53 A. 573 (1902);
White v. Williams, 90 Md. 719, 727, 45 A. 1001 (1900).
Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 683, 68 A. 887 (1907).
16 Ehrhart v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., supra, n. 153, 43. Of. Cromwell v.
Sharon Bldg. Assoc., 220 Md. 317, 324, 152 A. 2d 548 (1959) ; Poole v.
Miller, 211 Md. 448, 461, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957) ; Glass v. Bldg. & Loan
Assn., 156 Md. 26, 143 A. 587 (1928). Compare Lakeview Building and Loan
Assn. v. 'Beyer, 4 Balto. City Reports 177 (1923).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Since under the Permanent and Dayton plans the mem-
bers bore no common relationship with regard to termi-
nation, the bonus became obsolete. An inartificial use
of the word has persisted in the cases as being synonymous
with "premium."'15 6
On its face, the Act of 1894 would seem to preserve and
extend the power of building and loan associations with
regard to premiums, even though they might adopt the
Dayton plan form of issuing paid-up stock. The Court of
Appeals held, however, that no such change was intended:
"The only change .. .made by the Act of 1894, so
far as it relates to the premium, is the addition of a
provision that the borrower, instead of paying the
whole amount of the premium in advance or having
it deducted from the sum advanced to him by the
association, may pay it in such weekly, monthly or
other instalments as may be agreed upon and its pay-
ment may be secured by the mortgage given to the
association for the repayment of advances.
"The change thus effected in the law relates solely
to the time and method of payment of the premium
and affords no warrant for substituting an indefinite
or variable amount for the fixed and definite sum that
we [have] held . . .to be the meaning of the words
'such premium as may be agreed upon' which still re-
main in their original place in the amended statute."'' 7
Since the statute conferred no broader right to exact a
premium than had existed before,' or, stated otherwise,
since no change was made in the basis for exacting a
premium, a premium had no place in the Permanent asso-
ciation having paid-up stock. 59
Fines were still permitted by the statute; and the Court
recognized that they could be levied and their payment
-1 Cf. Poole v. Miller, ibid.; Glass v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., ibid. Compare
Lakeview Building and Loan Assn. v. Beyer, ibid. See also, 2 Mo. CODE
(1957) Art. 23, § 147. Distinguish, Musgrave v. Morrison, 54 Md. 161, 166
(1880) where the Court saw the imposition of a bonus as a convenient
manner of apportioning "priofits earned or supposed to have been earned by
the Company." See also, pages 113-114, infra.
15 Washington Bldg. Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 701, 53 A. 573 (1902).
See pages 11-12, supra.
Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 293, 296-308
(C.C.D. Md. 1901) aff'd as to this point sub. nom. Coltrane v. 'Blake,
113 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1902). The Master there points out the distinction
between a "competitive" and a "non-competitive" premium. Despite some
grumblings from the Bench, the British recognized the latter form. The
Maryland cases make it clear that the premium authorized by the Acts
of 1852 and 1894 is of the "competitive" variety. See the discussion at
pages 11-12, 8upra.
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secured by mortgage, subject to the rules laid down in
the earlier cases.160 However, the existence of paid-up
stock substantially reduced the necessity for the non-bor-
rowing free shareholder to make his weekly payments
of dues:
"[T]he number of shares a man holds cuts very little
figure. The money paid in on them is the basis of the
calculation for dividends. This has a most important
side effect. The money actually paid in by a member,
not what he ought to have paid, as in the older plans,
is the basis of dividends. It is, therefore, no longer
necessary to insist that a member, not a borrower,
should make the payments his shares call for. No
attention is, therefore, paid as to whether a non-bor-
rower pays up or not. If he does not it is his own affair;
nobody but himself is the loser. Neither are fines ever
assessed on the non-borrower, no attention is paid to
him except to adjust his dividend in accordance with
his payment."16'
The form of security given by a borrowing member was
altered to the extent that the interest of the borrowing
member terminated when the sum advanced to him had
been repaid rather than at the time when all shares of
the association had reached their par value.'62 The legal
rate of interest remained at 6% of the sum advanced until
total repayment. 63
Most important, and even in an association operating
under the Dayton plan, mutuality was retained. The Court
of Appeals provides this description of such a corporation:
"According to the general scheme of the associa-
tion ... subscribers to its stock had the option of pay-
iwStewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 683, 68 A. 887 (1907).
Cf. Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 343, 148 A. 420 (1930).
1161 Report of the Commissioner of Labor, op. cit. supra, n. 144, 336. As
there suggested, in addition to being unnecessary, it was probably unwise
for an association to assess fines against a non-borrowing member, since
this might deter some from joining the association. Some authorities
viewed failure to charge fines to free shareholders as an independent
feature of the Dayton plan. SUNDHEIM, 'BUILDING AND LOAN AssocIATIoNs
(3d ed. 1933) § 14. However, it is properly viewed as merely another
aspect of the effect of paid-up stock.
10 Stewart v. Building Association, supra, n. 160, 680; 'Border State Perp.
Build. Assoc. v. McCarthy, 57 Md. 555 (1882). Compare Murphy v. Preston,
107 Md. 444, 447-448, 69 A. 114 (1908).
us Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 577-578, 48 A. 2d
769 (1946); Commercial Ass'n v. Mackenize, 85 Md. 132, 143, 36 A. 754(1897) ; Border State Perpetual Build. Ass'n v. Hilleary, 68 Md. 52, 11 A.
505 (1887); Border State Perpetual Build. Ass'n v. Hayes, 61 Md. 597
(1884) ; Border State 'Perp. Build. Ass'n v. McCarthy, 57 Md. 555, 561-562
(1884).
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ing for it in cash at its face value, or by the payment
of specified monthly installments, called 'dues' until
its maturity i.e. until the assets of the association
made the stock worth one hundred dollars per share.
The holders of full paid shares were subject to no
further assessments and received dividends at the
fixed rate of eight per cent per annum. The holders
of installment shares received no dividends but their
stock was to be credited with a proper share of the
earnings of the association.
"On [advances] . . . the borrowing stock holder
was required to pay, in . . . installments, interest at
the rate of six per cent per annum and a premium at
the same rate. If the borrowers [sic] stock was install-
ment stock he was required in addition to pay the
monthly dues on it. Every member was entitled to one
vote at meetings of the association for each share of
stock held by him, except that no member who was
indebted to the association could vote upon any ques-
tion affecting its claim against him."'64
One feature of this corporate structure is important to
note. Although paid-up stock received a fixed dividend,
which made it similar in nature to "preferred stock,"'65
to view this preference as implying two distinct classes of
shares would be erroneous.' 66 All stock - including that
of the installment free shareholder and the borrowing
member - had the same rights when fully paid. In the
case of the borrower, however, his stock when so paid was
surrendered to the association. In the case of non-borrower
who was purchasing his shares by the payment of install-
ments, he could not claim the incidents of full ownership
until such time as he had paid the full par value of his
shares. 6 7 In fact, that he was to receive any dividends on
1"Preston v. Woodland, 104 Md. 642, 644, 65 A. 336 (1906). See also
Murphy v. Preston, supra n. 162, 447; Coltrane v. 'Blake, supra, n. 159;
Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 8upra, n. 159, 272-319.
10 Cf. Coltrane v. Blake, supra, n. 159, 789; Coltrane v. 'Baltimore Build-
ing and Loan Ass'n, supra n. 159; BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW
AND PRACTICE (Rev. ed 1953) § 74, p. 80.
"IColtrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, supra, n. 159. Cf.
Stewart v. Building Association, supra, n. 160, 682. But see Tucker v.
Osbourn, 101 Md. 613, 614, 61 A. 321 (1905). Whether an association was
permitted to issue more than one class of stock seemed, prior to 1961,
to be in doubt. Cf. Tucker v. Osbourn, supra, 617-618; SuNDHEIm, op. cit.
supra, n. 161, § 17; Letter of C. Ferdinand Sybert, Attorney General,
and Lawrence F. Rodowsky, Assistant Attorney General, to Albert W.
Ward, Director of the Department of Assessments and Taxation, dated
June 23, 1960, as yet unpublished.
17 Cf. BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (Rev. ed.
1953) § 194.
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shares which were not fully paid had always been some-
what of an anomaly.'
The Twilight of the Participating Association
An English jurist, noting the operation of an early asso-
ciation stated flatly that "in truth, the whole scheme is but
an elaborate contrivance for enabling persons having sums
for which they have no immediate want to lend them to
others at a very high rate of interest."'69 In 1907, there was
a frontal attack upon the system as it then operated in
Maryland. It was there argued that "few borrowers upon
building association mortgages are aware or are informed
as to the rules or covenants in regard to its repayment"
and
"[T]he rigid enforcement of the shareholders doc-
trine.. . is generally held by the members of the bar
here (in Baltimore) and including many of those
representing Building Associations and working there-
under, as most burdensome and unjust, and that the
appellant voices their general sentiment in urging the
Court to so modify or relax said rule as to place the bor-
rowers and non-borrowers on a more equal footing."'7 °
The Court of Appeals, noting that the argument contained
inherent recognition of a distinction between "participat-
ing" and "non-participating" associations, refused to effect
a judicial amalgamation of the two operations. But there
were a number of external circumstances which brought
about just such a result.
Although the Court of Appeals has recently noted that
"Undoubtedly, the general purposes of building associa-
tions are to promote thrift and to facilitate the building or
purchase of homes, or both,"'' the latter feature, as a
corporate end, had begun to erode with the introduction
of the Permanent association; and the process was all but
complete under the Dayton plan. While the borrowing
member still obtained some benefits from his membership,
the continuity of the Permanent plan association and the
capital of the Dayton plan association lay in the free share-
IS Cf. Baltimore City Pass. Railway Co. v. Hambleton, 77 Md. 341, 347,
26 A. 279 (1893).
16 Lord Cranworth, in Fleming v. Self, 3 DE G. M. & G. 997, 1015, 43
Eng. Rep. 390, 394 (1854).17°O'Sullivan v. Traders' Assn., 107 Md. 55, 61, 68 A. 349 (1907). The
Appellant had apparently been emboldened by the decision of the Fourth
Circuit in Coltrane v. Blake, 8upra, n. 159.I' Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 457, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
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holder; and the purpose of the corporation was to serve
him. Somewhat unconsciously, this shift in emphasis was
noted by the Court of Appeals in analyzing the charter and
by-laws of an early Permanent association:
"Its primary object is the investment of money for
profit and gain, whilst its secondary effort should be
its division and distribution in such manner as to
secure to each shareholder his just and fair proportion
of its profits." '172
This shift in emphasis was of course reflected in objec-
tive circumstances. The purposes of a borrowing member
in joining the association and that of the paid-up, or even
the installment, free shareholder were entirely different -
if not antithetical. The only thread which bound this
rather amorphous group together was the fact that all
shared, to one degree or another, in the profits of the
association. 173
As the free shareholder came to dominate the associa-
tion, the payment of dividends to one who was in all other
respects nothing more than a borrower, must have been
somewhat irksome. Under the Dayton plan, the factor had
a second thrust. Persons who would wish to pay interest
at the rate of six per cent on the principal amount during
the entire period of the debt in return for the dubious right
to share in the profits of the association after a fixed return
had been given to paid-up shareholders undoubtedly be-
came increasingly difficult to find.174
Another important blow to the existing system was its
effect, in the Federal courts, upon the liability of the bor-
rowing member in an involuntary liquidation of the asso-
1 
'Paito. Bldg. As'n v. Powhatan Co., 87 Md. 59, 64, 39 A. 274 (1898).
See also, Hennighausen and Wolff, Receivers v. Tischer, 50 Md. 583, 588
(1878).
173 There had always been a latent distinction between borrowing and
non-borrowing members. As stated by STONE, BENEIT BuLDING SOCIETrES
(1851) p. 11:
"... [Slocieties were composed of two classes of members. Those
who entered the society for the mere purpose of saving a certain sum
of money at interest by the payment of monthly or quarterly con-
tributions, and from whom no security would be required; and those
who wished to borrow money to invest in the purchase of real prop-
erty, and in building thereon, or not, and who could give a security
on it for the value of -their shares or the money advanced to them
by the society . .. .
See also, THORNTON & BLACKLEDGE, BUILDING AND LOAN AssocIATIoNs,
(1898) p. 8, fn. 1. Cf. Murphy v. Preston, supra, n. 162.
'As already noted, because of the fact that it would be impossible
to predict the extent of the dividends to which a borrower would be
entitled, the borrower never knew the duration of his indebtedness. Cf.
page 19, supra.
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ciation. In 1902, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit overruled the Circuit Court for the District
of Maryland and reinstated the report of Special Master
John C. Rose, in holding that:
"In our opinion, the debt due to the association by
the borrowing stockholder [on involuntary dissolu-
tion] should be adjusted by charging him with the
sum really advanced, with interest thereon at 6 per
cent., and by crediting him with all sums paid by way
of premiums and interest, upon the principle of par-
tial payments, the remainder thus ascertained to be
part of the assets of the association; that on the debt
account he receive no credit for dues paid by him; and
that in the final distribution of the assets he share in
them in proportion to the amount paid in by him as
))175dues upon his stock, with interest thereon....
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to follow
this rule,76 the possibility of liquidation of the association
in the Federal courts could only make a prudent borrower
wary.
It would also seem to be a fair conclusion that improved
financial conditions, and the increase in the number of
building associations,17 7 were effective inducements to the
individual association for providing a rate of interest more
favorable to the borrowing member. Elementary dictates
of competition necessitated basic changes. The "Divers
persons, chiefly amongst the industrial classes" referred to
in the preamble of the Act of 1852 were, at very least, in
a more favorable position in the Twentieth Century. To
these considerations can be added the now-proven fact
1 (Emphasis supplied). Coltrane v. Blake, 113 F. 785, 792-793 (4th
Cir. 1902) reversing Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110
F. 293 (C.C.D. Md. 1901). The holding rested upon the view that the
borrowing member's subscription contract and his mortgage debt were
distinct contracts. Cf. Murphy v. Preston, supra, n. 162. Since he shared
in the profits of the association under the subscription contract until he
had repaid the sum advanced, the Fourth Circuit concluded that he
must share in the losses.1 6Preston v. Woodland, 104 Md. 642, 65 A. 336 (1906). See also the
cases cited in n. 63, supra. Neither the Maryland Court of Appeals nor
the Fourth Circuit made specific reference to the opinions of the other.
1 In 1893, there were 239 associations in Maryland which styled them-
selves building -and loan associations, having assets of approximately
$12,500,000. -See n. 127, supra. In 1921, it was indicated that a report
showed 850 associations with total assets of $72,000,000. Lakeview
Building and Loan Assn. v. Beyer, 4 Balto. City Reports, 177, 179 (1923).
In 1940 it was estimated that there were 652 active associations in the
State with assets of $160,000,000. C. Keating Bowie, Jr., ' Building and
Loan Associations", Research Division, Maryland Legislative Council,
Research Report No. 9 (1940) pp. 14-15.
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that building associations can exist - and grow and pros-
per - without the benefits which the participating associa-
tions derived from their high rate of interest.
The Drop Interest Plan
Most Permanent and early Dayton plan associations in
Maryland seem to have operated on the share accumula-
tion plan,""8 charging interest on the full principal amount
during the entire period of the loan and allowing the bor-
rower to share in the profits. There was respectable legal
support for the view that any other system, whereby the
borrower would pay interest only on unpaid balances
would be contrary to the principles of building and loan
associations:
"[T]he borrowing member had no right to claim credit
on his loan for the payments of stock dues made by
him when and as he made them. He could not claim
to do this because he was a partner or quasi partner
with the free shareholders. Each of them had con-
tracted to pay in their stock dues until the shares
mature. The free shareholders were not entitled to
draw interest on their stock payments, and conse-
quently the borrowing shareholders had no right to
receive interest on their payments upon the same
account. It is clear that, if the borrowing members
were allowed a reduction of interest on their loans on
account of the payments made by them on their shares,
they would in effect receive interest on those stock
payments. To that they were clearly not entitled, and
could not be so long as the association was a mutual
association.' 1 79
There had been several other factors which operated
against charging interest only on unpaid balances. For one
thing, where borrowing members shared equally in the
profits of the corporation with free shareholders, it was
questionable how far a reduction in the return from in-
terest was feasible. Also, in Permanent or Terminating
associations, any change in the amount derived from in-
terest could only adversely affect the already unsatisfac-
tory rate of accumulating the fund from which loans were
made. Finally, there was nothing which would prompt the
1
78 The term "share accumulation plan" is that used by C. Keating Bowie,
Jr., op. cit. supra, n. 177, p. 3.
179 Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Association, 110 F. 293, 304
(C.C.D. Md. 1901). But, see the references in the following footnote.
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adoption of such practices, since there had been little com-
petition for the business of the person with whom building
associations dealt.
But, even as early as 1893, before the provision for
paid-up stock was added to the statute, 62 Maryland asso-
ciations operated under this plan of repayment:
"Under this plan there is no premium. The bor-
rower pays interest on his loan in regular instalments,
but the principal is reduced periodically by the amount
of the dues paid in by the borrower, and interest is
charged on the balance only."18 0
Reduction of interest took three separate forms: (a)
the "direct reduction plan," whereby the amount paid in
each week as dues was deducted from the principal and
the remainder formed a new principal upon which interest
was computed for the next payment;8 1 (b) the "reducing
payment plan," which involved recomputation of the prin-
cipal amount upon which interest was based at quarterly,
semi-annual, or annual periods rather than after each pay-
ment;"8 2 and (c) the "drop interest plan,"'' 8 3 the method most
widely used in Maryland, under which the rate of interest
is redetermined each time that payments of dues equal
the par value of one share of stock.
The mechanics of the drop interest plan are a modifica-
tion of the procedure necessary under the share accumu-
lation plan. In order that payments of interest might be
equally distributed throughout the year, the weekly pay-
ment is determined by dividing the amount of yearly in-
terest on the par value of each share of stock by 52, being a
practical approximation of the number of weekly payments
in a year.' When the quotient contains a fractional part
__ Report of the Commissioner of Labor, supra, n. 144, 393. See also,
Waverly Mut. Build. Asso. v. Buck, 64 Md. 338 (1885), which involved a
Permanent association using the "drop interest plan."
1S So far as has been found, this method of computation received
only recent acceptance in the industry. Cf. SUNDHEIM, op. cit. supra, n.
161, § 18. C. Keating Bowie, Jr., op. cit. supra, n. 177, suggests, page 3,
that "the direct reduction plan has received much popularity." It is
thought that he refers to the "drop interest plan." The practical difficulties
of the direct reduction plan under a system where payments are made
weekly are all but insurmountable.
182 SUNDHEIM, op. cit. supra, n. 161, § 18.
188 Cf. Mtge. Bond Ass'n v. Baker, 157 Md. 309, 312, 145 A. 876 (1929).
Although the association involved in that case was a non-participating
association, operating under a most unique system, the description of the
operation of the drop interest plan is apposite here.1 4Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 579, 47 A. 2d 769
(1946). Cf. Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 682, 68 A. 887
(1907).
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of a cent, it is of course resolved by rounding off the figure
to the next penny. Thus, for shares with a par value of
$125, equal weekly installments of interest would be
$14.42+0; and the prescribed weekly installment on each
share would be 15¢.111 This results in a yearly payment of
30 in excess of 6% of the $125 par value of the shares,
which is both usurious in a typical loan transaction,186 and
also in excess of the legal interest permitted in a building
association transaction.8 7
Some associations sought to obviate this difficulty by
styling the weekly payment "interest and premium."'8 8
Others found solution in having shares with a par value of
$104, the weekly interest on which would be exactly 12¢;
or $130 when weekly interest would be 15¢. This prac-
tice was not widely adopted, probably because of the
difficulty of making advances in multiples of 104, or 130.189
Surprisingly, the matter has not been raised successfully
in recent years. In the only case where objection was
made, 9 ' it was held that the question was barred by volun-
tary payment.191
Under the drop interest plan, this method of computing
interest is retained; but the weekly payment of interest
ceases as to one share each time the accumulation of dues
paid in equals a multiple of the par value of the stock.'92
'
92Magness v. Loyola Say. & Loan Ass'n, ibid., 15 cents would also be
weekly interest on $130 par value shares. -Stewart v. Building Association,
ibid. See also, Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 342-343, 148
A. 420 (1930) for a description of the system for $100 par value stock.
'M Cf. MD. CONST., Art. III, § 57; 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 49, §§ 1, 3.
Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, supra, n. 184, 597
'8 E.g. Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 8upra, n. 185, 343. This practice
has been condemned by the Court of Appeals as "evasive, and tending to
elude the restriction which the statute imposes ....... Washington 'Bldg.
Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 702, 53 A. 573 (1902). See also Waverly
Mut. Build. Asso. v. Buck, 64 Md. 338, 343, 1 A. 561 (1885) ; Shannon v.
Howard Mut Build. As., 36 Md. 383 (1872). Consider also the effect
of a non-competitive premium. See n. 159, supra.
'But where adopted the borrower "would have paid precisely the
same amount to the association . . . that she would have paid at the
legal rate of interest .... " Stewart v. Building Association, supra,
n. 184, 682.
Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, supra, n. 184.
'Ibid., Cf. 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 49, § 6.
192 Cf. Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 8upra, n. 185, 343. Form #47 of
The Daily Record Company of Baltimore, which is in extensive use,
provides for "drop interest" in this manner:
". .. [T]he said Mortgagor . . . covenant[s] . . . to pay and per-
form, as follows, that is to say: To pay the Mortgagee its successors
and assigns weekly, the sum of .... cents on each of said ....
shares of stock as dues, until the combined payment of dues shall
amount to ...... Dollars for each of said ...... shares, and also to
pay weekly, the sum of ...... cents for each of said shares, as
interest and premium, until the par value of said shares shall be
fully paid in, provided that whenever, by payment of said dues the
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In return for this privilege, the borrowing member usually
(at present, always) surrenders his rights to vote and par-
ticipate in the profits of the association. At first, the drop
interest plan probably existed as an "option" to the bor-
rower - undoubtedly the result of a feeling that he should
not (and because of the Court of Appeals, insistence upon
mutuality, could not) be deprived of these membership
rights except upon his own election:
"The by-laws allow for loans 'on the drop interest
plan,' upon which the borrower is not to share in the
profits of the association, 'or on any other plan agreed
upon,' and the form of the [association] . . .for loans
speaks of an option in the borrower in the choice of
plan; but, actually, all borrowers have contracted on
the drop-interest plan, and, so, have been without in-
terest in the profits of the association's business." 19
In 1940, a report to the Legislative Council noted the
decline of the share accumulation plan."' The dearth of
cases in this century involving such transactions would,
however, seem to indicate that the process of decline was
more rapid and more complete than there implied. In any
event, by 1946, Judge Markell, for the Court of Appeals,
observed that:
"Building association 'advances' and mortgages [on
the share accumulation plan] are anomalous artificial
legal transactions, but are not novel or unprecedented
in Maryland. Rather, in practice, they already seem
to be obsolescent." '195
IV. PERMUTATION
The importance of the drop interest plan in shaping
the modern building and loan association cannot be over-
emphasized. Since the borrowing member, as a concom-
mitant to his "election" to make repayment under the drop
interest plan, relinquished all right to participate in the
sum of ...... dollars shall be paid in upon said loan and all interest
and fines then due shall have been paid . . .all interest and premium
shall cease as to one share of said loan, and so on until said loan
has been fully paid . . . ." [See also, infra, n. 225.]
Provision is also made for the payment of a weekly amount for taxes,
water rent other public dues, ground rent, and insurance. There is also
a covenant to pay fines. Note the reference to "interest and premium" in
that form. See 8upra, n. 188.
m Mtge. Bond Ass'n v. Baker, 157 Md. 309, 312, 145 A. 876 (1929). See
also, supra, n. 183.
I" C. Keating Bowie, Jr., op. cit. supra, n. 177, 3-4.
11 Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, supra, n. 184, 576.
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profits of the association, the transaction was divested of
any semblance of the sort of "mutuality" which had been
seen as necessary in a building and loan transaction. But
any real problems in this regard were immediately made
moot by the fact that the drop interest plan involved only
a relatively inconsequential attempt to exact interest in
excess of 6%; and the lack of cases seems to indicate that
even borrowers wink at the practice, if indeed it would
be economically feasible to engage in protracted litigation
on the point.
With these developments, the nuances'96  of the
"advance" transaction became largely problems of the
past; but the rise of the free shareholder had opened a
whole Pandora's box of new problems. Some of these are
very nearly like those of other types of stock corpora-
tions. 197 Others have a particularly unique flavor and are
worthy of note: the status of the free shareholder and
the borrower and the matter of surplus.
The Free Shareholder
Surprisingly, it was contemplated by the original Act
of 1852 that the subscriber to the stock of building and
loan associations would receive "certificates" although of
course he had not yet paid for them.9 ' He was also
19 Even the Court of Appeals complained about the "misapprehension
which has prevailed to a considerable extent on the subject of the liability
of a building association for usurious interest." Commercial Ass'n v.
MacKenzie, 85 Md. 132, 142-143, 36 A. 754 (1897) ; Building Association v.
McCarthy, 57 Md. 555, 559 (1882).
11 Recent cases have involved questions of: (a) voluntary dissolution
[Building & Loan Assn. v. Gimbel, 171 Md. 1, 187 A. 856 (1936)];
(b) involuntary dissolution [Mendelis v. Broening, 168 Md. 488, 178 A.
238 (1935); Polly v. Camden Bldg. & Say. Assn., 167 Md. 577, 175 A.
599 (1934) ; Monroe v. Broening, 167 Md. 239, 173 A. 203 (1934) ; Kraft v.
Building Assn., 165 Md. 570, 169 A. 71 (1933)] ; (c) ultra vires transactions
[Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957) ; National Bank v.
Crockett, 145 Md. 435, 125 A. 712 (1924) ; Montrose Bldg. Assn. v. Page,
143 Md. 631, 123 A. 68 (1923)]; (d) dividends [Polly v. Camden Bldg.
& Sav. Assn., ibid; of. Kraft v. Building Assn., ibid] ; (e) merger [Ash
v. Citizens B. & L. Ass'n, 225 Md. 395, 170 A. 2d 750 (1961)] ; (f) duties
of corporate promoters, officers and directors [Poole v. Miller, 8upra;
Etgen v. Wash. Co. B. & L. Ass'n, 184 Md. 412, 41 A. 2d 290 (1945);
Building Assn. v. Crimi, 172 Md. 238, 190 A. 830 (1937) ; 'Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1936); Polly v. Camden Bldg.
& Say. Assn., supra; Balto. Amer. Ins. Co. v. Ulman, 165 Md. 630, 170 A.
202 (1934) ; Ehrhart v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 157 Md. 40, 145 A. 202 (1929) ;
Building Union v. Juengst, 153 Md. 36, 137 A. 498 (1927) ; Montrose Bldg.
Assn. v. Page, ibid; Tucker v. Osbourn, 101 Md. 613, 61 A. 321 (1905);
Reus Loan Co. v. Conrad, 101 Md. 224, 60 A. 737 (1905)].
18i)M. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, §4. The portion of that section which
related to the power "to issue to each member . . . a certificate of the
shares of stock held by him" was rendered unnecessary by the General
Incorporation Act of 1868. Cf. MD. LAWS 1868, Ch. 471, § 85. See also
Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 68 A. 887 (1907).
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given a "pass book" '199 in which a running account was
kept of the dues which he had paid and, in the case of
Permanent associations, the profits which had been credited
to his account from time to time as dividends. With the
advent of the Dayton plan, it was the practice for some
associations to issue conventional certificates to those pur-
chasing paid-up shares and also to installment free share-
holders, at least when their payment of dues ripened their
subscription into paid-up shares. °0
Early practice was also to pay dividends on paid-up
stock in cash.20 1 Many, perhaps a majority, of those hold-
ing paid-up stock would have no desire to receive the cash
dividend, 02 but would rather use this income either to pur-
chase additional paid-up shares or to apply toward the pur-
chase of paid-up shares under some theory of "pre-pay-
ment,"203 although the theory of allowing either paid-up
or installment members to invest beyond their original
subscription was never carefully articulated.2
0 4
As this process continued, the number of paid-up shares
ultimately surpassed the number of installment shares; but
even before then it became impossible, if only from an
economic standpoint, to treat the former as being entitled
to a high, preferential dividend. Such preference as was
needed to meet the situation was adequately met by de-
I" Of course, borrowing members were also given pass books. Cf. Watson
v. Loan & Savings Asso., 158 Md. 339, 345, 148 A. 420 (1930).
Cf. Frederick v. Lyons, 173 Md. 95, 97, 194 A. 815 (1937) ; Coltrane
v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 281, 284 (C.C.D. Md. 1901);
Tucker v. Osbourn, 101 Md. 613, 617-618, 61 A. 321 (1905).
201 E.g. Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 680, 68 A. 887
(1907); Preston v. Woodland, 104 Md. 642, 644, 65 A. 336 (1906); Col-
trane v. Blake, 113 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1902) aff'g 110 F. 272 and 110 F. 281
(C.C.D. Md. 1901).
Although they were of course free to withdraw them. Cf. Frederick
v. Lyons, 173 Md. 95, 102, 194 A. 815 (1937).
2Cf. Building Union v. Juengst, 153 Md. 36, 37, 137 A. 498 (1927);
Frederick v. Lyons, 173 Md. 95, 102, 194 A. 815 (1937). There was a
distinct difference between "paid-up" stock and "prepaid" stock. Paid-up
stock was subject to no further assessments and received a fixed dividend.
Prepaid stock represented the payment of a certain portion of the pur-
chase price with dividends building up this down payment to the full
par value. THORNTON & BLACKLEDGFE, BUILDING AND LOAN AsSOCIATIONS
(1899) § 10; Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor,
"Building and Loan Associations," H.R. Exac. Doc. No. 209, 43d Cong.
Sess. 427 (1894).
"Cf. Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 281, 284
(C.C.D. Md. 1901). Nor, it seems, was any formal requirement made if
a person contributed beyond' his original subscription. Cf. Building Union
v. Juengst, 153 Md. 36, 137 A. 498 (1927). The usual manner of ascer-
taining the shares owned was to divide the amount of money in the
free shareholder's account by the par value of the association's shares. Cf.
Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 452, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
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claring a fixed dividend on each paid-up share and allow-
ing the installment members a proportional part thereof.
The associations, ever eager for more capital, naturally
favored these trends; and the most convenient manner of
keeping a record of such transactions was through the pass
book rather than a more conventional form of share cer-
tificate. There was no legal reason why a building and loan
association might not designate a "pass book" for this pur-
pose (although few deliberately did so) so long as the
formal requirements of the general incorporation laws
were met.20 5 In any event, the pass book of a free share
member came to represent simultaneous evidence of (a)
the ownership of paid-up stock; (b) amounts paid toward
the purchase of additional paid-up stock; (c) dividends
paid from time to time; and (d) withdrawals.
In form and appearance, these pass books were similar
to the account books of a depositor in a savings bank. °6
In fact, little distinction could be made between the factors
which motivated the savings depositor of a bank and the
subscriber to free shares of a building and loan association.
The result is illustrated in a case decided in 1934 in which
the Court of Appeals held that a woman who had placed
money in a building association had been misled into
believing that she was making a savings deposit:
"Taking into consideration the appearance of the
building ['similar to bank buildings'], the large sign
as you enter the door '6% On Savings,' the fact that
they did take [but paid interest on] Christmas sav-
ings accounts, the form of the deposit as evidenced
by the passbooks [i.e. the usual trust form and the
designation 'Savings Account'], and the way in which
those accounts were kept in the pass books [showing
principal balance and dividends], together with the
testimony of the complainant [who was not able to
read, write or speak English] as to the conversation
which she had with the officers of the defendant
at the time of making the initial deposits, we can
reach no other conclusion than that she is a savings
depositor.... 27
201 Cf. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 27; BALI.T.ANE, CORPORATIONS
(Rev. ed. 1946) § 198.
"Even the preamble of the Act of 1852 referred to weekly dues as
"deposits." And often the payment of dividends was referred to as
"interest."
Building & Loan Assn. v. Dembowczyk, 167 Md. 259, 269, 173 A. 254,
(1934). Cf. Polly v. Camden Bldg. & Say. Assn., 167 Md. 577, 175 A.
599 (1934).
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As there indicated, the form of ownership of these
accounts was also indistinguishable from that of the sav-
ings bank deposit. The similarity has been noted in several
recent cases:
"Maryland decisions have concluded that there is
no rational basis for drawing a distinction between
accounts in savings banks and accounts in savings and
loan associations as far as the rights of depositors as
between themselves are concerned."
20 8
The reservation is important, since a building and loan
association has never been able to conduct a banking
business. ° 9 Thus, whereas there is a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship between the bank and the savings depositor,21 0
the relationship between a building and loan association
and a shareholder is, from a legal point of view, markedly
different. With regard to a Permanent association, the
Court of Appeals had held that "a withdrawal [by a free
shareholder] is a direct reduction of capital to the amount
of the shares held by the member withdrawing, and a con-
version of the stock into a debt due by the corporation
to him, after deducting all his liabilities, as in the case of
a partner retiring from a firm."2 1' In a later case, the rule
was stated in somewhat expanded form:
"[The] . . . relations [of free shareholders] to the
association were essentially one of partnership for a
definite time, entitled upon its expiration to the profits
of their investments, and with the right to withdraw
upon notice in writing to the directors.... Their mem-
bership does not terminate until the notice has been
given and accepted, and until then, they could not
assume the position of creditors. . . . Their claim
begins only after every creditor has been satisfied. '21 2
(Emphasis supplied.) Jones, Adm. v. Hamilton, Adm., 211 Md. 371,
380, 127 A. 2d 519 (1956). See also Bireau v. Bohemian Bldg. etc. Assn.,
205 Md. 456, 459, 109 A. 2d 120 (1954) ; 21 Ops. Att'y Gen., 754 (1936).
Cf. 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 11, §§ 63ff. See also Frederick v. Lyons,
173 Md. 95, 97, 194 A. 815 (1937). Some associations were authorized to
accept deposits by special act of the Legislature. Cf. National Bank v.
Crockett, 145 Md. 435, 442, 125 A. 712 (1924).
20E.g. Keller v. Frederickst'n 'Say. Inst., 193 Md. 292, 296, 66 A. 2d
924 (1949); Pritchard v. Meyers, 174 Md. 66, 76, 197 A. 620 (1938);
Terminals Co. v. Hospelhorn, 172 Md. 291, 298, 191 A. 707 (1937) ; Sand
& Gravel Corp. v. Hospelhorn, 172 Md. 279, 289, 191 A. 701 (1937).
" Hennighausen and Wolff, Receivers v. Tischer, 50 Md. 583, 589 (1879).
Steinberger v. Savings Asso., 84 Md. 625, 634, 36 A. 439 (1897). But,
when requisite notice had been given, the free shareholder became a
creditor. Hennighausen and Wolff, Receivers v. Tischer, ibid. See also
Bldg. & Say. Assn. v. Gorsuch, 180 Md. 185, 191, 23 A. 2d 672 (1942);
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It can readily be seen that there are important dif-
ferences between the debtor-creditor relationship arising
from the deposit situation and the right of withdrawal
from a corporation. The withdrawal of a person holding a
large number of free shares, or a large number of with-
drawals in times of general economic adversity, could deal
a mortal blow to a building association, which would have
most or all of its capital at work and would not have the
other operations available to a bank to cushion the blow. 13
Unless there was a relationship which permitted some
regulation of withdrawals, a building association would be
in a peculiarly vulnerable position. 14
The Borrowing Member
To characterize the transaction between the association
and the borrower as an "advance," it seems that the bor-
rower must have retained some interest in the profits and
losses. 15 The result had been that the transaction was
"regarded in the same light as if it were a mortgage be-
Building & Loan Assn. v. ,Gimbel, 171 Md. 1, 6, 187 A. 856 (1936) ; Building
Union v. Juengst, 153 Md. 36, 41, 137 A. 498 (1927) ; Southern Bldg.
As'n v. Price, 88 Md. 155, 164, 41 A. 53 (1898) ; Hampstead Building No.
11 Asso. v. King, 58 Md. 279, 280 (1882). Cf. Cook v. Emmet 'Bldg. Assn.,
90 Md. 284, 288, 44 A. 1022 (1899).
The situation posed a potential problem within the association itself.
It was early demonstrated that one member could obtain a preferred
status if he were given a promissory note or other negotiable instrument
as evidence of his interest in the corporation. Davis v. West Saratoga
Bldg. Union, 32 Md. 285 (1870). See also, Monroe v. Broening, 167 Md.
239, 173 A. 203 (1934). In 1878, in an obvious move to reverse the deci-
sion in the Davis case, the General Assembly provided that 'all building
and loan associations, including the non-participating associations formed
under the Act of 1872, could not "issue any promissory note, bill or
obligation of any kind to any member thereof ..... ." MD. LAWS 1878,
Ch. 154; 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 155. This provision is equally ap-
plicable to the present form of association. Monroe v. Broening, 167 Md.
239, 173 A. 203 (1934). Cf. National Bank v. Crockett, 145 Md. 435, 125
A. 712 (1924).
uCf. Hampstead Build. Asso. v. King, 58 Md. 279 (1882); Windsor
v. Bandel, 40 Md. 172 (1874). Fortunately, due to the shareholder theory, a
building and loan association did not have to maintain a large reserve of
cash. Kraft v. Building Assn., 165 Md. 570, 573, 169 A. 71 (1933).
* See the solution reached during the Depression. MD. LAWS 1935, Ch.
474, extending the life of MD. LAWS 1933, Ch. 47. Both expired on June 1,
1937.
mCf. Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 578, 47 A. 2d
769 (1946); W'atson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 341, 148 A.
420 (1930); Goldman v. Building Assn., 150 Md. 677, 680-681, 133 A.
843 (1926) ; O'Sullivan v. Traders' Assn., 107 Md. 55, 58 A. 349 (1907) :
Citizens Security & L. Co. v. Uhler, 48 Md. 455 (1878) ; Williar v. Loan
Ass'n, 45 Md. 546 (1877); 'Balt. Perm. B. & L. Soc. v. Taylor, 41 Md.
409, (1875) ; Montl. Perm. B. & L. Soc. v. Lewin, 38 Md. 445 (1873).
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tween individuals, and apart from any law relating to
Building Associations." '216
In Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn.,217 involving a mort-
gage on the drop interest plan under which the borrower
surrendered all rights in the profits of the association, the
Court of Appeals stated that the Act of 1872218 would
operate to cancel the shares of the borrowing member.
Reference to the by-laws of the association, as found in
the record on appeal and as stated in the opinion of the
Court, indicates that although the member released his
interest in the profits, he did not surrender such other
elements of membership as might exist until he had satis-
fied the mortgage debt. 19
While it might be argued that there were some such
incidents of membership which the borrower did not sur-
render at the time that he received a loan from the associa-
tion, the technical correctness of the view taken by the
Court was without practical significance. The modern
association, not claiming the special privileges incident to
the "advance" transaction,22 ° would have little reason to
quarrel over whether or not it was a "non-participating"
association. Even the result reached in the Watson case -
that the by-laws of the association and the mortgage con-
stituted "contemporaneous, complementary, and connected
documents of a single transaction between the parties to
which they had all assented" '22 - was similar in effect to
the result reached in earlier cases.222
Moreover, it would be difficult to find more in the rela-
tionship of the modern association and its borrowers than
that of mortgagor and mortgagee. The "mutual" interest of
free shareholders and borrowers had become somewhat
strained when provision was made for paid-up stock;2 3 and
the drop interest plan, with the attendant surrender of in-
terest in profits, at least precluded any view of the corpora-
tion as a partnership.2 4 While the transactions between
1 Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 578, 47 A. 2d 769(1946) ; Balt. Perm. B. & L. Soc. v. Taylor, 41 Md. 409, 418 (1875).
7158 Md. 339, 148 A. 420 (1930).
" Then 2 MD. CODE (1924) Art. 23, § 169.
Cf. Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 579, 47 A. 2d 769
(1946).
This is subject to a slight qualification with regard to the charging of
excess interest under the drop interest plan. See pp. 104-105, supra.
2Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 346, 148 A. 420 (1930).
2Compare, Morrison v. Dorsey, 48 Md. 461, 472 (1878) ; McCahan v.
Columbian Build. Asso., 40 Md. 226 (1874).
See pp. 99-100, supra.
Cf. Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 578-579, 47 A.
2d 769 (1946). Although the point does not seem to have been raised,
with regard to the Maryland corporations, it is not clear what effect
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the association and its borrowers continued to be con-
ducted in the manner prescribed by the Act of 1852, i.e. an
"advance" to a "member,"2 5 such formalities can be re-
garded as little more than "technical compliance with the




The Permanent associations probably contemplated a
complete division of profits among the shareholders, with
no retention of surplus. However, the practice of allow-
ing a free shareholder to withdraw his dues and accrued
dividends appeared to some to be unfair to the members
who did not withdraw until the maturity of their shares,
and to the association itself.27  Solution was found in
establishing a "contingent fund," or surplus, to which all
contributed but which would not be withdrawable by an
individual member leaving the association.22 After the
full impact of the Dayton plan had been felt, the status
of a paid-up free shareholder re-enforced the reasons for
establishing a surplus to protect the continuing members
from the vicissitudes of corporate operation.2 9 A logical
corollary was that such a reserve represent some diversi-
fication of assets, to which can be added the fact that it was
this relationship had upon the exemption from Federal income taxation
which was granted to associations "substantially all the business of which
is confined to making loans." Cf. United States v. Loan & Bldg. Co., 278
U.S. 55 (1928).
5MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 6; 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 149.
Form #47 of The Daily Record Oompany, referred to supra, n. 192, con-
tains the following language, in compliance with 5 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 66, § 2.
"WHEREAS, the said [Mortgagor] being [a] member of the said
body corporate ha[s] received therefrom an advance of ...... Dollars
on ...... share[s] of stock, the due execution of this Mortgage having
been a condition precedent to the granting Of said advance."
m Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 340-341, 148 A. 420
(1930). The Act of 1872, dealing with non-participating associations,
contemplated similar empty formalities. See also THORNTON & BLACKLEDGE,
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1898) p. 8, fn. 1.
2" THOMPSON, BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1899) § 9,
(1st ed. 1892) pp. 7-8. The problem was two-fold. First, if the associa-
tion met reverses, those who had withdrawn their dues and a propor-
tional part of all the profits would obviously have received a better return
on their money than those who remained with the association. Also, to
allow a member the privilege of withdrawing any part of the profits in-
volved some inconvenience to the association itself: "The association is
endeavoring to mature its stock, yet it permits withdrawing stockholders
to take away a part of its ability to do so." THOMPSON, Op. Cit. supra.
m THOMPSON, id. As there indicated, in some States the creation of a
surplus was required by statute.
229While these shareholders would be less likely to feel any small
losses, since their dividend was usually fixed, their preferred status would
tend to intensify the effect of such losses upon the other members.
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often not possible to put all available capital to use in
mortgages.23 0
But, in the use and management of surplus, the early
rule that "a mutual association based on the mutual plan
.. is bound to treat its members equally, and any by-law
or contract made by it in contravention of such mutuality
would be ultra vires and void"2 1 provided little assist-
ance. In 1917, the Legislature permitted building associa-
tions to invest in State and Federal bonds;232 but this
authorization did not in terms restrict associations to this
type of investment only. 233 Aside from such as might be
found in the individual charters or by-laws, there were
only general guides.23 4
Another difficulty surrounding the surplus involved
the obvious fact that, as new free shareholders were ad-
mitted, the interest of the persons who were then members
was proportionately diluted. Solution lay either in apply-
ing some form of pre-emptive rights or reviving and ex-
tending the "bonus" feature of the Terminating associa-
tions, i.e., requiring the entering member to pay such
amount as "to place [him] ... on a footing with.., others,
holding stock at the time of such application. ' 235 Although
various solutions were attempted,2 6 the problem became
more and more difficult:
"New funds cannot be brought in without having
an effect upon the amount of the surplus applicable
to each share unless there are frequent - perhaps
daily - calculations reflecting the financial condition
of the association and the value (book or actual) of
its shares, and a premium [i.e. bonus] based thereon
is charged for new shares. If book value were always
2 Cf. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 458, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
B-alto. 'Bldg. As'n v. Powhatan Co., 87 Md. 59, 64-65, 39 A. 274 (1898).
MD. LAWS 1917, Ch. 28. The provision was made obsolete by MD.
LAWS 1929, Ch. 226, § 165, p. 720, and was removed from the Code by 31D.
LAWS 1943, Ch. 2.
mPossibly a patriotic measure to encourage the purchase of war bonds,
the measure made it lawful for building associations and non-participating
associations to "buy, hold or lend upon United States bonds and bonds of
the State of Maryland." It was probably necessary both in order to
allow building associations to "lend upon" bonds as well as to remove
any question about the right of such corporations to deal In stocks and
bonds for investment. See BRUNE, MARYLAND Col'oRAWIon LAW AND
PRAcTIcE (Rev. ed. 1953) § 48; Montrose Bldg. Assn. v. Page, 143 Md. 631,
635, 123 A. 68 (1923).
See, :BRUNE, op. cit supra, n. 233, § 55.2 MD. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 5; now 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 147.
E.g. Balto. Bldg. As'n v. Powhatan Co., 87 Md. 59, 65, 39 A. 274
(1898). Cf. Musgrave v. Morrison, 54 Md. 161, 166 (1880). See also,
Building Union v. Juengst, 153 Md. 36. 39, 137 A. 498 (1927).
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true value, this might not be a difficult calculation;
but such calculations seem better adapted to the oper-
ations of mutual investment trusts than to those of a
small building and loan association. . . . From this
point of view, even the maintenance of exact pro rata
asset value seems difficult, and the almost constant
issuance of 'rights', as a means of according pre-emp-
tive rights seems impracticable. 2 37
Prelude To Chaos
Unfortunately, the charters and by-laws of the build-
ing and loan associations, never models of clarity,23 did
not keep pace with these changes in practice. In one re-
cent case, significant variation was found between an asso-
ciation's by-laws and practice with respect to the handling
of mortgage applications, the number of directors elected,
the duration of loans, the investment of surplus, and the
collection of entrance fees.239
No one reason, or set of reasons, can adequately cover
all of the factors which contributed to the existence of
this situation. Those which at least contributed were the
variety of transactions which the term "building and loan
association" had come to suggest during its long period of
evolution; 2 ° the confusion which existed among the text-
writers as to the significance of the rapid changes which
had taken place;241 the physical presence of the Act of
1872, relating to the discredited "non-participating" asso-
ciations, under the sub-title "Building or Homestead Asso-
ciaitons" ;242 and the failure of the courts, through lack of
necessity, to apply the distinction between participating
13 Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 461, 462, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957). Note the
treatment of the problem by the association there involved. Id., 464.
23 See the cases cited in n. 14. supra.
2 Poole v. Miller, supra, n. 237. The Court of Appeals held that the
by-laws in question were repealed by "desuetude." Cf. Building Union
v. Juengst, 153 Md. 36 43, 137 A. 498 (1927) ; National Bank v. Crockett,
145 Md. 435, 441, 125 A. 712 (1924).
m_ Under the Act of 1852, Terminating and Permanent associations were
permitted. After the Act of 1894, a building and loan association could
issue paid-up stock, i.e. operate on the Dayton plan. 'Both (the share
accumulation and drop interest plans were permitted' by the Act of 1852.
See also n. 206, supra.
21 See n. 147, supra.
m In recent years, the Court of Appeals has referred to the subtitle
"Building or Homestead Associations" as if no distinction existed be-
tween the types of corporation described thereunder. Cf., e.g. Ash v.
Citizens B. & L. Ass'n, 225 Md. 305, 309, 170 A. 2d 750 (1961) ; Poole v.
Miller, 211 Md. 448, 452, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957) ; Watson v. Loan & Savings
Assn., 158 Md. 339, 148 A. 420 (1930).
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and non-participating associations.243 It must also be re-
membered that the process was an evolutionary one, dic-
tated at times by competitive reasons. Building and loan
associations, always in a preferred position with regard
to taxation,244 chose not to look too closely at changes
which might suggest a basis for altering this treatment.
And, as new officers and directors245 came upon the scene,
it was natural, and no doubt easier, to accept the practices
which they found and not delve too carefully into the
complexities of the system.
1929 And After
The position in which Maryland building and loan asso-
ciations found themselves after the economic upheaval
of 1929 certainly did not result from any defects which
"s Cf. Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., ibid., where the Court applied
the Act of 1872 to a transaction where it clearly appeared that the asso-
ciation did not contemplate that the shares would be cancelled at the
time the money was advanced. See pp. 111-112, supra.
-,"The original Act of 1852 provided in § 7 that "any such mortgage or
mortgages, and the mortgage debt or debts intended to be secured there-
by . . . is, and are hereby declared exempt from taxation; the property
so mortgaged . . . to the corporation, being taxed in the hands of the
individual member or mortgager [sic]." Following a hiatus during the
periods 1866-1868 and 1876-1880 [Appeal Tax Court v. Rice, 50 Md. 302
(1879)], the Legislature provided by MD. LAWS 1880, Ch. 351 that "any
such mortgage, and the mortgage debt created thereby, and the shares
of stock of any such corporation, and of all corporations for the loan
of money on mortgage of real or leasehold property, are hereby declared
to be exempt from taxation to the extent of such corporations, invest-
ments in such mortgages, the property so mortgaged to the corporation
being taxed in the hands of ithe individual member or mortgagor." Sub-
sequent amendments to the taxing statutes raised some doubts as to
the applicability of such exemptions to transactions which were strictly
loans [Faust v. Building Association, 84 Md. 186, 35 A. 890 (1896) ; of.
Salisbury As'n v. Wicomico County, 86 Md. 615, 39 A. 425 (1898)]
and MD. LAWS 1904, Ch. 240 amended the provision to read: "any such
mortgage and the mortgage debt created thereby, and the shares of stock
of any corporation, and of all building associations, are declared to be
exempt from taxation to the extent of the investments of such corporation
in mortgages, whether such mortgages be building association mortgages
or ordinary mortgages, the property so mortgaged to the corporation being
taxed in the hands of the mortgagor." Judgments or decrees were added
to the list of exempt holdings by MD. LAWS 1916, Ch. 312; and the entire
section was transferred to Article 81 of the Code by MD. LAWS 1929,
Ch. 226. See 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 9. Cf. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md.
448, 457, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957). Exemption was also granted from the
State Income Tax [Art. 81, § 288 (g) (3)] ; Franchise Tax [Art. 81, § 197
(d)]; and to a limited extent, Bonus Tax [Art. 81, § 194 (c)]. The
Federal exemption made no such attempt to shape the character of the
organization. United States v. Loan & ,Bldg. Go., 278 U.S. 55 (1928).
See also n. 276, infra.
21 There is a conscious, but unsupportable, failure to include attorneys.
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were peculiar to their operation.246 But, the large number
of cases which reached the courts served to focus upon the
changes which had been taking place within the industry.
The Maryland Legislature regarded the situation as an
"emergency in relation to the affairs of building and home-
stead associations." '247 Whether it was prompted by this
crisis is not clear;24 but in 1929 the General Assembly
provided regulation of the nature and character of invest-
ments which might be made by such corporations. There-
after, building and loan associations were allowed to
invest2 49 only in cash, fixtures, loans on hypothecated stock,
judgments, mortgages on real property within the state,
and public bonds.25 °
In 1932, the Federal government entered the building
and loan field with the passage of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act,251 which provided that certain building and loan
associations might become members of the Bank and re-
ceive loans therefrom. By way of the Home Owners Loan
Act of 1933,252 provision was made for the issuance of
Federal charters by the Home Loan Bank Board; and addi-
tional legislation with respect to building associations was
enacted by the National Housing Act of 1934.253 Maryland
promptly provided enabling legislation.254
m The difficulties were nationwide. RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN Asso-
CIATIONS (1956) pp. 31-35: C. Keating Bowie, Jr., "Building and Loan
Associations," Research Division, Maryland Legislative Council, Research
Report No. 9 (1940) pp. 4-5; BODFISH & THEOBALD, 'BUILDING AssoCIATIoNs
(1940) pp. 59-61; SUNDHEIM, LAW OF BUILDING AND LOAN AssocrATIoNs,
(3d ed. 1933) p. 4.
"7 MD. LAWS 1935, Ch. 474, § 2. It has been estimated that in 1931 there
were 1100 building and loan associations in Maryland with assets of
$210,000,000 and total membership of 320,000 persons. SUNDHEIM, Op. cit.
supra, n. 246, § 3. See also, n. 177.
m BODFISH & THEOBALD, op. cit. supra, n. 246, where it is suggested that
there was a delayed reaction so far as building and loan associations were
concerned.
249 It appears that this refers to the matter of dealing with surplus
rather than the type of security which might be accepted for mortgages.
Cf. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 457458, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
MD. LAWS 1929, Ch. 226, § 165, p. 720. The provision raises several
questions, not least of which Is the fact that the provision is found in
a lengthy tax revision statute in which, inter alia, the tax exemption
afforded building associations was transferred to Art. 81 of the Md. Code.
This seems rto be a violation of Art. III, § 29, of the Maryland Con-
stitution which provides that no statute may embrace more than one
subject. See, Everstine, Titles of Legislative Acts, 9 Md. L. Rev., 197,
212-218 (1948). In any event, the provision would seem to be now
superseded by MD. LAWS 1961, Ch. 205 and MD. LAWS 1961 (Spec. Sees.)
Ch. 1 now MD. CODE (1961 Cum. Supp.) Art. 23, §§ 161Z, 160Z.
231 Now, 12 U.S.C.A. (1952) Ch. 11.
Now id., Ch. 12.
Now supra, n. 251, Ch. 13.
2MD. LAWS 1933, Chs. 26, 27; MD. LAWS 1933 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 62;
MD. LAWS 1935, Chs. 232, 233, 567. See 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §§ 150,
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After 1929, the Maryland legislature took a more benev-
olent attitude toward the building and loan industry.
Temporary relief from the drain caused by the with-
drawals of free shareholders was made by providing that
no association was required to pay such member "a greater
amount than his pro rata share of the total amount of dues
received by such association or corporation from borrow-
ing members.. . in the ratio which the total paid in value
of the shares demanded for redemption bears to the total
paid in value of unredeemed shares then outstanding. '"2 5
In addition to prohibiting members who had given early
notice of withdrawal from obtaining a preferential posi-
tion with regard to the assets of the association, associa-
tions were kept in somewhat liquid condition through the
retention of the portion of its weekly dues ascribed to
members who chose to remain with the association. 56
Undoubtedly, the statute did much to preserve stability
during this period, since a member who might otherwise
not desire to withdraw would, in the absence of the statute
or a by-law provision within the association, have become
fearful if he saw others receiving a full return of their
assets.257 Although the statute expired by its own terms
in 1937, it has been incorporated in the by-laws of many
associations.
Provision was also made during this period for the
operation of foreign building and loan associations,58
although it is clear that they had operated in Maryland
prior to this time.259 The latest of the statutes on this sub-
ject, passed in 1955, prohibits the opening of new associa-
tions, whether incorporated in Maryland or elsewhere,
which have their principal offices in other States.260
154, 159. Of. Hardy v. Gibson, 213 Md. 493, 502-503, 133 A. 2d 401
(1957); Magness v. Loyola Say. & L. Ass'n, 186 Md. 569, 572, 47 A. 2d
769 (1946).
25 5 MD. LAWS 1933, Ch. 47; MD. LAWS 1935, Ch. 474. The provision
expired by its own terms on June 1, 1937, and was removed from the
Code by MD. LAWS 1945, Ch. 875
-" Cf. Building & Loan Assn. v. Gimbel, 171 Md. 1, 187 A. 856 (1936);
Mendelis v. Broening, 168 Md. 488, 178 A. 238 (1935) ; Kraft v. Building
Asan,. 165 Md. 570, 169 A. 71 (1933).
'm See also, the argument of THOMPSON, BUILDING AND LOA ASSOCIATIONS
(2d ed. 1899) § 9. See n. 227, supra.
2MD. LAWS 1929, Ch. 453; MD. LAWS 1937, Ch. 309; MD. LAWS 1939,
Ch. 272; MD. LAWS 1955, Ch. 234. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 156.
2E.g. Washington Bldg. Assn. v. Andrews, 95 Md. 696, 53 A. 573
(1902) ; Southern Bldg. As'n v. Price, 88 Md. 155, 41 A. 53 (1898)
Commercial Ass'n v. Mackenzie, 85 Md. 132, 36 A. 754 (1897).
M MD. LAWS 1955, Ch. 234. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 156.
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The Industry Plays Power Politics
After this spate of legislation, none of which, except
the restrictions placed upon investments, had any limiting
effect upon the Maryland associations which did not choose
to become affiliated in some way with the Federal govern-
ment, the industry settled back into its state of procedural
indifference, prodded into activity only occasionally by
threats to impose supervisory regulation or to destroy the
tax exemption, both of which were, until 1961, successfully
resisted.
The details of the political in-fighting surrounding these
abortive attempts to impose regulation need be alluded
to only briefly. In 1940, the Legislative Council, noting
that "bills have been presented to the General Assembly
from time to time to regulate or supervise building and
loan associations"; that "Maryland was the only State
which did not have some form of regulatory legislation";
and that "the assets of building and loan associations in
the State approximate $200,000,000" presented a super-
visory bill to the Legislature.26' This followed the recom-
mendations of a special report prepared by the Council's
Research Division.262 The bill was introduced in the Senate
on the first day of the 1941 session-' but nothing further
was done to effect its passage.
In 1942, following the publication of an additional re-
search report,264 and two public hearings by the Legisla-
tive Council, "the Council . . .again reached the conclu-
sion that the business of building and loan associations in
Maryland is of such importance and affects so many people
in the State that legislation should be adopted for their
regulation and supervision." '265 Accordingly, the bill was
introduced in the House of Delegates by the Speaker; but
when it reached the floor with a favorable committee
report,266 it was given two death-dealing blows from which
it never recovered. Upon hearing the committee's report,
the bill was immediately recommitted; and then, by a
2lLegislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of
1941, p. 5. Maryland Legislative Council, Proposed Bills Submitted to
the General Assembly of 1941, pp. 84-89.
" C. Keating Bowie, Jr., "Building and Loan Associations," Research
Division, Maryland Legislative Council, Research Report No. 9 (1940).
Journal of the Senate (1941) p. 18.
211 Bowie, "Supplemental Report on Building and Loan Associations,"
Research Division, Maryland Legislative Council, Research Report No. 18
(1942).
Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of
1943, p. 3; Additional Proposed Bills Submitted to the General Assembly
of 1943, pp. 149A-157A.
Journal of the House of Delegates (1943) pp. 77, 1842-1843.
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64 to 50 vote, the whole matter was tabled.267 Again in
1945 the Legislative Council introduced a somewhat-modi-
fied bill in the Senate. 26 1 Nothing more was done until a
new bill was introduced in early March.269 After a good
deal of maneuvering, 2 0 it was passed by a vote of 16 to
12.271 However, when the measure reached the House of
Delegates in the closing days of the session, it was never
reported out of the Ways and Means Committee.2  The
subject of regulation and supervision was not seriously
proposed again until 1960.273
At the same time, the power of the building and loan
lobby was so great that it experienced no difficulty in
effecting the unanimous passage of bills which it favored.
In 1943, both branches of the Legislature unanimously
voted to add ground rents as permissible investments for
building and loan associations. 74  And, in 1945, the
present provisions with regard to shares held by minors
was added,27 5 along with a provision conferring certain
membership rights on all persons connected with the
associations.2 76
Such legislation as was enacted after the threats of
supervision had subsided was of a particularly ad hoc
nature. In 1951, there was final solution to the long-stand-
ing problem of capitalization. 7  A statute passed in 1953
with regard to joint or trust accounts with "savings and
loan associations 27 merely codified existing practice279 and
Id., 1842-1843.
Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of
1945, p. 4; Additional Proposed Bills Submitted To The General Assembly
of 1945, pp. 1-A to 11-A.
2" Journal of the Senate (1945) p. 720.
-' Id., 937-941.
271 Supra, n. 269, 1255.
2Journal of the House of Delegates (1945) p. 2005.
21A bill passed in that year (House Bill 93) was vetoed by the
Governor. MD. LAws 1960, pp. 310-313.
2'MD. LAWS 1943, Ch. 132. Journal of the Senate (1943) p. 500; Journal
of the House of Delegates (1943) pp. 325, 1810.
"'
3 MD. LAWS 1945, Ch. 73, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 148.
2" MD. LAWS 1945, Ch. 875, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 157. This was
apparently an attempt to comply with the provision under which exemption
was granted from the Federal Income Tax. 42 Stat. 227, 253, § 231 (4).
United States v. Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55 (1928). Since 1951, the
Internal Revenue Code provides a deduction rather than an exemption.
See 26 U.S.C.A. (1952) §§ 591-593. The definition of a building associa-
tion remains unchanged, 26 U.S.C.A. (1952) § 7701 (19).
27' ID. LAWS 1951, Ch. 361. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 144 (a). Cf.
page 25, supra.
'-$MD. LAWS 1953, Ch. 157. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 145. Cf. 1 MD.
CoDS (1957) Art. 11, § 102.
2E.g. Jones, Adm. v. Hamilton, Adm., 211 Md. 371, 380, 127 A. 2d 519
(1956) ; Bireau v. Bohemian Bldg. etc. Assn., 205 Md. 456, 459, 109 A. 2d 120
(1954), and cases there cited.
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came suspiciously close after the issue was raised in
litigation;"' and it is generally conceded that the pro-
visions of the present section relating to shareholders'
meetings,2 ' and probably that relating to Christmas fund
accounts,282 were directly or indirectly the result of a then-
pending suit.283 Nor should these laws be viewed as curing
only the irregularities in the cases involved, since a ma-
jority of associations were operated in the same manner.
Regulation and Supervision Achieved -?
Apart from deliberate legislative action, during the
latter part of the 1950's, there emerged a new form of
organization which, despite striking differences in form
and purpose, styled itself a "building (or savings) and loan
association." There were variations in the details of the
corporate structure, but the basic plan of all was to vest
effective voting control in a small group of promoters,
with provision for the preference of the stock held by them
upon liquidation. 4 In June, 1960, the Attorney General
ruled that "the creation of various classes of stock with
direct and indirect priorities . . . is not prohibited by
present Maryland law" and that "voting restriction fea-
tures .. .are permissible."285
Shortly before that pronouncement, the Legislature,
with only slight difficulty,2 8 passed a bill which was aimed
at the regulation and supervision of building and loan
associations. The measure was vetoed by the Governor. 7
At the same session, a bill concerning the advertising of
the insurability of free share accounts was introduced, but
not passed.8
By this time, the forces which had theretofore advo-
cated the supervision and regulation of the building and
loan industry had enlisted the aid of their former oppon-
ents. Whether, as has been often suggested, this resulted
210 Bireau v. Bohemian Bldg. etc. Assn., ibid..
28 MD. LAws 1955, Ch. 31, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 158. A similar
provision in 2 MD. CODE (1939), Art. 23, § 20, had been inadvertently
removed by MD. LAws 1951, Ch. 135.
2 M2D. LAWS 1955, Ch. 771, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 160.
21 Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
28 Cf. Letter of C. Ferdinand Sybert, Attorney General, and Lawrence
F. Rodowsky, Assistant Attorney General, to Albert W. Ward, Director of
the Department of Assessments and Taxation, dated June 23, 1960, as yet
unpublished.
2Ibi.
286 Journal of the Senate (1960) p. 380; Journal of the House of Dele-
gates (1960) pp. 407-408, 503-504.
'' MD. LAWS 1960, pp. 310-313. The veto was sustained by a vote of 115-3,
even its original sponsor voting against over-riding the Governor's objec-
tions. Journal of the House of Delegates (1961) p. 16.
Journal of the House of Delegates (1960) p. 503.
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from a dislike for the new form of corporation is now some-
what academic, for in 1961 the Legislature passed a sweep-
ing regulatory bill289 in part as originally proposed by a
commission headed by Richard W. Case, Baltimore attor-
ney, with J. Calvin Carney, another Baltimore attorney
and a long-time foe of regulation and supervision as Vice
Chairman. For reasons involving the sufficiency of peti-
tions seeking to have the bill submitted to a referendum,
it was re-passed the same year, in slightly modified form,
at a special session of the Legislature.290 And, at its recent
session, the Legislature created the "Maryland Savings-
Share Insurance Corporation,"291 which is purportedly de-
signed "to promote the elasticity and flexibility of the re-
sources of member associations, to provide for the liquidity
of such associations through a central reserve fund, and to
insure the free share accounts of such associations. '"2 92
V. THE PLACE AND CHARACTER OF THE
MODERN AssoCIATION
It must be remembered that there has never been any
magic in the words "building and loan," for even the
earliest associations neither engaged in building nor made
"loans."2 9 In England, the same form of organization was
styled a "Benefit Building Society"; and Maryland incor-
porators had at least a choice between the names "building
and loan" and "homestead" to describe their associations.
Moreover, the Maryland Act of 1852 did not undertake to
describe the theory or, except in a general way, the pur-
pose of the organization which it contemplated. From the
very beginning, the term "building and loan" was little
more than an arbitrary phrase which ill-conceptualized a
system existing entirely apart from statute.
That some confusion should result was inevitable.
Failure to recognize that the benefits accorded these asso-
ciations were grounded in wholly extra-legislative consid-
erations foredoomed the non-participating associations en-
visioned by the Acts of 1868 and 1872.294 In 1942, a report
to the Legislative Council urged that "some clear defini-
tion should be adopted stating exactly what type of organi-
zation may operate under the name of a savings or build-
2SMD. LAWS 1961, Ch. 205. MD. CODE (1961 Cum. Supp.) Art. 23,
§§ 161A-161KK.
MMD. LAWS 1961 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 1, 2 MD. CODE (1961 CuM. Supp.)
Art. 23, §§ 160A-16OKK. See also, n. 6, supra.
"' MD. LAWS 1962, Ch. 131.
'Ibid., § 161NN (a).
See n. 13. svtpra.
See pages 26-29., su pra.
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ing and loan association." '295 More recently, the Attorney
General opined that "it is not altogether clear what a build-
ing and loan association is intended to be in Maryland. 296
So eminent an authority as the Supreme Court of the
United States has in effect suggested that the problem of
definition is ultimately to be solved by reference to the
reasons for which the building and loan association is
allowed to exist as a companion entity to other institutions
performing similar functions. 297 But this provides only par-
tial solution, since the professed confusion in Maryland
seems to stem from a feeling that the growth of the indus-
try has been so Topsy-like as to defy identification of any
present purpose. Before examining the place of the modern
association, it is therefore necessary to examine the
validity of that premise.
Evolution of Corporate Purpose
In 1852, the legislature envisioned building and loan
associations as existing "for the meretorious purpose of
accumulating, by small periodical deposits, a Savings'
Fund, by which they may be enabled to procure for them-
selves respectively, a Homestead, and for their mutual
benefit .... ,,298 As thus stated, the Act of 1852 reflected
three developments which had already taken place in
the industry as it had developed elsewhere: (a) the
reference to "building" was only of historical signifi-
cance;299 (b) all members were not necessarily home
buyers, but were divided into two distinct groups, in-
vestors and borrowers ;3 ° and (c) the opportunities offered
C. Keating 'Bowie, Jr., "Supplemental Report on Building and Loan
Associations", Research Division, Maryland Legislative Council, Research
Report No. 18 (1942) p. 30.
2 Letter of Attorney General, supra, n. 284.
"United States v. Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55 (1928). Cf. SUNDHEIM,
LAW OF BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) p. 16, fn. 41.
M AID. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, Preamble.
STONE, BENEFIT BUILDING SocirtIEs (1851) pp. 8-11. Cf. THORNTON
& BLACKLEDGE, BUILDING & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1898), § 5.
STONE, op. cit. snpra, n. 299, pp. 10-11. The original plan of building
and loan associations undoubtedly contemplated that all members would be
prospective home buyers. STONE, op. cit. supra, pp. 11, 18-19; ENDLICIT,
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1882) § 40. At the time of the
adoption of the Maryland Act of 1852, Great Britain had already dis-
carded this restrictive view. STONE, op. cit. supra. Undoubtedly the
language of the Maryland preamble ("accumulating ... a Savings' Fund,
by which they may be enabled to procure for themselves respectively, a
Homestead, and for their mutual 'benefit") represents a transitional view.
In a recent case this traditional factor was raised by a party who
claimed ithat a building and loan association could make loans only on
dwelling property. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957). It
was there decided that other transactions were authorized at least insofar
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to the middle classes for obtaining money and investing
represented aims which the state desired to foster. 30 1
The first embodiment of these concepts, in Mary-
land as elsewhere, was the Terminating association. The
modern association reflects three other distinct stages
of development.
1. The Permanent Association.
The Permanent plan involved little, if anything, more
than the substitution of termination dates for individual
members in place of a common termination at the extinc-
tion of the society. It represented no departure from early
purpose and, indeed, was designed to fulfill that purpose
more efficiently. So slight was the change that no new
legislation was required; and the legal principles thereto-
fore applicable to Terminating associations were almost
wholly unaffected. 2
2. The Dayton Plan.
In considering the effect of the issuance of paid-up
shares, it must not be overlooked that such change took
place as the result of specific statutory enlargement of the
original powers comprehended within the term "building
and loan association": "such corporation [reads the 1894
amendment to the Act of 1852] shall have power to issue
full paid-up shares of stock to its members .... ,303 In
legal effect, it did no more than broaden the words of the
1852 preamble to include the issuance of paid-up stock as
a method of accumulating the "Savings' Fund"; it did
not destroy the mutual features of a building and loan
association. 04
as the funds involved represented surplus, the Court being careful to
add that "We do not mean to imply that a different rule would be appli-
cable if there were no surplus .... It would seem that such a parochial
view had long since been discarded. SUNDHEnf, op. cit. supra, n. 297. § 8.
Cf. SCRATCHLEY, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (4th ed. 1868) § 12; STONE,
op. cit. supra, p. 11. See also the Preamble to the British statute quoted
supra. n. 8.
o The writers were ecstatic about -a variety -of benefits which are to flow
to society and the middle classes from the operation of building assucia-
tions. E.g. RUSSELL, SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1956) pp. 1 et seq.:
STONE, BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETIES (1851) pp. 36 et seq.; SUNDHEIM,
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) §§ 8, 9; THOMPSON,
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1899) § 12; THORNTON &
BLACKLEDGE, ,BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (1898) §§ 4, 6.
The Preamble of the Maryland Act speaks of "presenting to persons so
associated, a strong motive or inducement to economy and frugality, the
exercise of which cannot but promote their individual welfare, and
contribute largely to the 'taxable property of this State ....
302 See supra, n. 100.
8o3 MD. LAws 1894, Ch. 321.
801 The mere existence of paid-up stock did not destroy mutuality. Cf.
Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 281, 286 (C.C.D.
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As was intended, the Dayton plan made obsolete some
of the older devices employed by Terminating and Perma-
nent associations." 5 But, as recently noted by the Court
of Appeals with reference to entrance fees, such practices
were at most permissive; 6 and they had always been
somewhat antithetical to the beneficent aims of building
associations.
It cannot be denied that the issuance of paid-up shares
had significant effect upon the outward appearance of the
association. The relation of the free shareholder and the
association became markedly similar to that of a depositor
and the savings bank.30 7 The existence of "surplus" pro-
vided new problems.30 8 Most important, the paid-up free
shareholder, if only by virtue of his position as a perma-
nent member of the association, emerged as the dominant
consideration in corporate policy. °9 All of these results
are, however, effects of what was considered to be a
solution to the somewhat unstable character of the prior
arrangement.3 1
3. The Drop Interest Plan.
Unquestionably, the most oppressive feature of the
early associations was the exaction of interest at 6% dur-
ing the full term of the loan. No doubt the abandonment
of the practice was dictated more by competitive than
charitable reasons. Certainly the association's agreement
to the terms of this plan was more than a quid pro quo
for the borrower's surrender of his right to participate
in the profits of the association; 11 and the economic neces-
sity of requiring such a surrender is obvious. In fact, the
borrowing member gained advantages far beyond the mere
reduced amount of interest.32
Md. 1901), aff'd sub nom. Coltrane v. Blake, 113 F. 785 (4th Cir. 1902);
Balto. Bldg. As'n. v. Powhatan Co., 87 Md. 59, 39 A. 274 (1898). Cf.
Stewart v. Building Association, 106 Md. 675, 682, 68 A. 887 (1907).
5 See pages 95-97, supra. Others seem to have been abandoned for
competitive reasons. E.g. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 461, 128 A. 2d 607
(1957). But see, Cromwell v. Sharon Bldg. Assoc., 220 Md. 317, 152 A.
2d 548 (1959).
Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 460, 462, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957).
See pgaes 108-110, supra.
See pages 113-114, supra.
See pages 99-102, 111-112, supra.
ao See pages 18-20, 91-92, supra.
"I Coltrane v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass'n, 110 F. 293, 304
(C.C.D. Md. 1901).812 (a) The duration of his obligation was now fixed with absolute cer-
tainty; (b) because of the first factor, associations could offer to
borrowers a choice of the period over which they wished to repay; (c) the
borrower did not have to share in the losses in case of the default of the
association.
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This surrender of interest in the association undoubt-
edly destroyed the qualification for treatment as a mort-
gage securing an "advance 13 - an academic result at
best, since the associations did not attempt to claim the
benefits of that form of mortgage. But, to treat associa-
tions operating under the drop interest plan as non-par-
ticipating associations under the Act of 1872, as was done
somewhat unconsciously in one case, 14 is to ascribe to
them a lineage which is improper and thus to provide
basis for unnecessary confusion in the meaning of the term
"building and loan association. 3 15
Moreover, the surrender of rights in the profits of the
association, not without concommitant advantage to the
borrower, represented no departure from early purpose
insofar as the borrower was concerned, for it is by no means
clear that the fact that the borrowing member shared
in the profits was of primary concern to him. In 1878,
Judge Alvey noted with regard to a Terminating associa-
tion that "The supposed benefit of the [mortgage] contract
to the mortgagor consists mainly of the length of time and
gradual manner in which payments are required to be
made. 3 16 This feature remains unaffected by the develop-
ments in the practices of building associations:
"While the mortgagors [under the drop interest
plan] were not members of the association, yet their
position as borrowers was affected by the special form
of the business of the association, and the uniformity
of its methods in making, pursuant to its by-laws,
loans upon the security of real or leasehold estate, and
in being paid the principal and interest of the loan in
small weekly installments. It is because of the peculiar
terms upon which the mortgage debt in building and
loan associations is discharged that [a] . . . privilege
of redemption is so prevalent a condition of the
loan .... ,,317
In the final analysis, the original purpose of providing
for the financial needs of a certain segment of the popula-
tion, although somewhat modified in form, remains the
important characteristic of the building and loan associa-
tion. As ably stated by the late Judge Charles F. Stein:
s qPP pages 110-112. supra.
811 Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., 158 Md. 339, 148 A. 420 (1930).
831 Although there would have been no impropriety in such confusion
under the British statutes. See paa-es 24. 26-27, sunra.
ale Low Street Build. Asso. v. Zucker, 48 Md. 448 (1878).
U7 Watson v. Loan & Savings Assn., supra, n. 314, 345-6.
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"The distinguishing mark of a building association
is neither the terminating feature nor the sharing of
profits and losses among its members; but is the loan
of money to its members to be used in the purchase of
real or leasehold properties, usually for homes of the
borrowing members, the loan and interest thereon to
be repaid in small weekly installments....
The End of Laissez-Faire
In the preceding discussion, the consistency of purpose
reflected in the evolution of the modern building associa-
tion has been treated as a somewhat inevitable product
of internal self-discipline; but it would be naive to suppose
that this result was entirely, or even largely, the result of
conscious effort on the part of the associations. There were,
first of all, a variety of statutory stimuli which produced,
or induced, this result, one being the restrictive nature of
the tax exemption granted to them.
At first, the exemption extended only to the "advance"
transaction under the share accumulation plan."9 With
the widespread use of the drop interest plan, and the neces-
sity for treating the relationship between the parties as
that of borrower and lender, the exemption was broadened
to include "building association mortgages or ordinary
mortgages .. .*"30 Similar enlargement was made with
the allowance of judgments as permissible security3"' and
the designation of legal subjects of "investment." '22 Only
recently the Court of Appeals has noted that the form of
the exemption from taxation granted to building associa-
tions "is doubtless intended to promote thrift and home
ownership. '323
There was also certain restriction as to form, which
was not, however, to be found by more than implication.
Although there were statutes which purported to be of
special application to corporations of that description, most
had no operation in prevailing practice;324 and the others
811 Lakeview Building & Loan Association v. Beyer, 4 Balto. City Reports
177, 178 (1923).
mlMn. LAWS 1852, Ch. 148, § 7; MD. LAWS 1880, Ch. 351. Faust v.
Building Association, 84 Md. 186, 35 A. 890 (1896) ; Appeal Tax Court
v. Rice, 50 Md. 302 (1879).
M MD. LAWS 1904, Ch. 240.
82 MD. LAWS 1916, Ch. 312.
M11D. LAWS 1929, Ch. 226, p. 720.
mPoole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 128 A. 2d 607 (1957). It is interesting
to note that, until 1929, such exemption was granted for the expressed
reason -that "such mortgages . . . [were] taxed in the hands of the mort-
gagors." See also, n. 244, supra.
-' See pages 95-97, supra.
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supplemented, rather than restricted, the powers granted
to ordinary corporations.32 ' Both in their organization and
operation, the modern building association drew more
heavily upon other areas of the law. But, while the portion
of the law headed "Building or Homestead Associations"
might play no active role in present practice, yet it sug-
gested a certain form of organization which, in a superficial
sense, provided a formal (if artificial) manner of conduct-
ing a business which was otherwise subject to regulation.126
The survival of these vestigial remnants of the share
system were not without importance. Building associa-
tions, although exempt from the banking laws, were never
allowed to conduct a banking business;327 and there was
certain utilitarian value in delimiting the permissible scope
of operation by stating, as the Court of Appeals did in dis-
cussing the status of a person who "hypothecated" money
with an association to insure payment of a mortgage by a
third party, "The association never received deposits of
money! it did no banking business; its transactions were all
with shares. ' ' 328 The share fiction operated in other areas
to keep the transactions within proper bounds. 2 9
Most important, however, is the fact that as the statutes
purporting to be of special application to "building associa-
tions" suggested a certain form, they also in a very real
sense suggested purpose - if only by tradition. As stated
by one recent legal writer "The name has no legal or prac-
tical significance, except that, by usage, it has become
descriptive of a peculiar class of corporations with especial
rights and powers. '33 0 Even more, it suggested a purpose
that was incapable or difficult of combination with other
purposes. The situation is well-illustrated by Fraternal
Alliance v. State.33 '
There, a corporation had been formed for the purposes
of (a) a "Fraternal Beneficial Society"; (b) issuing life in-
"E.g., 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 144, 145, 148, 158, 160.
2 Compare 1 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 11, §§ 31, 63.
3- Cf. 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 3; Davis v. West Saratoga Bldg.
Union No. 3, 32 Md. 285 (1870).
Frederick v. Lyons, 173 Md. 95, 97, 194 A. 815 (1937). Cf. 1 MD. CoDE
(1957), Art. 11, § 80.
mE.g., (a) Providing a distinction upon which money could be with-
drawn only upon certain conditions. See pages 109-110. 117, supra. (b) Pro-
viding a graphically distinct method of conducting what would other-
wise be banking functions. Cf. 1 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 11 § 31. (c)
Giving notice of sorts to members of the public who joined such asso-
ciations of the peculiar character of the institution - and the different
nature of its hazards. Cf. Building Association v. Dembowczyk, 167
Md. 259. 173 A. 254 (1934).
M SuNDHEUM, op. cit. supra, n. 297, § 6. Watson v. Loan and Savings
Assn.. supra. n. 314. 345-6.
'86 Md. 550, 39 A. 512 (1898).
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surance policies; and (c) investing its surplus in "loans ...
upon the building association plan. .. ."" A fraternal
beneficial society defined by statute as operating "for the
sole benefit of its members and not for profit," was author-
ized to issue "certificates" (but not policies) to its mem-
bers in unlimited amount, while the type of corporation
contemplated by the second purpose of the charter in-
volved was authorized to issue insurance policies not in
excess of $1,000 on any one life. The Fraternal Alliance
sought to amalgamate the unlimited authority of its
"Fraternal Beneficial Society" feature with the right to
issue insurance policies under its second charter purpose.
It was contended that such "double incorporation" was
authorized by the general incorporation law. In affirming
a decree ordering the forfeiture of the charter of the Fra-
ternal Alliance, the Court of Appeals noted that:
"[A]ithough it may be that one corporation can, as
a fraternal beneficiary association, carry on certain
parts of its business, 'for the sole benefit of its members
and their beneficiaries and not for profit,' and can,
as an insurance company, conduct another part of its
business for the benefit of its stockholders, yet it is
impossible that the business of two such classes can
be so blended as not to be separable, for if that be
done it can no longer be for the sole benefit of its
members. * * * If there be profits in the insurance
business, are the stockholders exclusively, or all the
members to share in them? Undoubtedly the former
would be the case. . . . The 'members,' as they are
called, are at the mercy of the stockholders, and the
business is conducted for the pecuniary benefit of the
latter, so far as we can see from the by-laws, and the
conduct of the business, and notwithstanding the space
given in the charter and the by-laws to the regulations
and provisions of the social or fraternal features of the
Alliance, the conclusion is irresistible that it is in
reality a life insurance company, and is seeking to re-
lieve itself of some burdens imposed on corporations
of that character, for the protection of the public, by
assuming the guise of a fraternal beneficial society. '333
As the general law relating to corporations developed,
the concept of purpose as delimiting power became in
-I., 553-554.
-Supra, n. 331, 559-560.
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large part an historical curiosity." 4 And, as "purpose" de-
clined as a limiting factor in general practice, the single-
ness of purpose of a building association became more
and more an anomaly. In addition, building associations
being otherwise incorporated and operated as general
business corporations, the significance of that purpose be-
came still more obscure. Existence under the general in-
corporation laws had in large part permitted the develop-
ment which has here been called "permutation" - trans-
position within a group or combination of things without
change in the constituent elements or parts of that group or
combination - and the multi-stock associations suggested
that more radical alteration might be possible. 5
The place and character of the institution known as
the building and loan association had been shaped largely
by default - by defining the other participants in the same
sphere and using the phrase "building and loan associa-
tion" as a sort of catch-all term to describe the financial
institution which was left over. Thus far, such indirect
factors as tax exemptions, fictional stock transactions, and
the exclusive nature of the purpose of building associations
had been sufficient to preserve their internal integrity.
But, in the increasing complex of modern affairs, loosely
styled progress, there is less room for such generalized
measures.
The 1961 legislation is thus at once the beginning of a
new era and the logical, perhaps inevitable, culmination
of the old:
"It is the declared policy of this State that: (a) The
savings and loan business, otherwise known as the
building savings and loan or homestead business ...
has so expanded in recent years and has become so
integrated with the financial institutions of this State
and is so important as a method of promoting home
ownership and thrift, that such business is affected
with a public interest and shall be supervised as a
business affecting the economic security and general
welfare of the people of this State....
It is in this context that the next chapter of the industry's
history will be written.
11 BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE (Rev. ed. 1953)
§§ 41, 55-56: BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 15.
115 Letter of Attorney General, supra, n. 284.
as MD. LAWS 1961, Ch. 205, § 161A (a); MD. LAWS 1961 (Spec. Sess.),
Ch. 1, § 160A (a).
